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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  06-3396
BLANCHE D. LEE,
               Appellant
   v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY,
JO ANNE B. BARNHART
                                            
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 04-CV-1767
District Judge: The Honorable William Ditter, Jr.
                                            
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 19, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH, and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed:   September 28, 2007)
                                            
OPINION
                                            
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Blanche D. Lee appeals from the judgment of the District Court for the
1The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We exercise
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which affirmed the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying Lee’s application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.1  Our review is limited to
determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s
decision.  42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Lee applied for disability benefits in July of 1997, alleging an onset of
disability in October of 1993 as a result of injuries sustained at work when she fell
down several stairs.  The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded that Lee
was not disabled before December 31, 1998, her date last insured, and denied her
application for benefits in March of 1999.  Lee appealed to the United States
District Court.  The Commissioner moved to remand, and the Court granted the
motion. 
At a second hearing, Lee amended her application because she had obtained
employment as an airport security screener in August of 2002.  Her amended
3application revised the alleged onset date of her disability from October of 1993,
when she was initially injured at work, to December of 1996, and sought a closed
period of disability from December of 1996 to July of 2002.  The ALJ denied Lee’s
amended application.  Lee’s second appeal to the District Court was unsuccessful. 
This timely appeal followed.  
Lee argues that the ALJ failed to comply with the remand order of the
District Court.  We are not persuaded.  The remand order declined to limit the
scope of the remand and remanded the case in its entirety so it could be
consolidated with the pending supplemental security income claim and resolved in
a comprehensive and updated decision.  This directive was embraced by the
Appeals Council, which identified several issues to be considered.  Before the ALJ,
however, the complexion of the case changed as the plaintiff amended her claim at
a second hearing, altering her alleged onset date and seeking only a closed period
of disability.  The ALJ’s analysis appropriately proceeded based on this amended
application and the new evidence offered during the second hearing.
This new evidence included the fact that Lee had returned to the workforce
in August of 2002 as an airport security screener.  Lee contends that the ALJ erred
by considering this fact as determinative of her medical status before her date last
insured.  We agree that Lee’s return to work is not dispositive of her eligibility for
4a closed period of disability.  Lee’s ability to work on a sustained basis, however,
was relevant.  We conclude that her return to the workforce was appropriately
considered by the ALJ in resolving Lee’s application for a closed period of
disability from December of 1996 to July of 2002, the month immediately
preceding her return to the workforce as an airport security screener.  
Lee asserts that the ALJ erred by discounting the opinions of her treating
physicians, Dr. Costello, Dr. Tabby, and Dr. Bell.  Our review shows that the ALJ
accorded great weight to the opinions of the treating doctors in finding that Lee
was limited to work of a light or sedentary nature during the applicable period.  It
is true that this finding does not fully credit the opinions of these physicians.  This
was not error, however, as the ALJ explained that there were significant gaps in the
treatment records of these physicians, which suggested that Lee was not suffering
to the extent she claimed, and  that some of the documentation in the records
contradicted her claims of complete disability.  For example, the ALJ pointed out
that Dr. Costello, who regularly provided facet blocks to relieve Lee’s back pain,
did not evaluate Lee during the first eight months of 1997, a period immediately
following the amended onset date of disability.  Dr. Tabby did not evaluate Lee
during the sixteen months preceding her return to the workforce.  
With respect to Dr. Bell, we conclude that the ALJ appropriately discounted
5his opinion.  As the ALJ noted, the record shows that the majority of Dr. Bell’s 
progress notes failed to assess her mental status, and that her treatment was limited
in time, lasting from July of 1997, seven months after the alleged onset of
disability, until only September of 1998.  
Lee submits that she was limited as a result of carpal tunnel syndrome in the
use of her upper extremities for fingering and feeling, and that the ALJ erred by
discounting these limitations.  We do not find any error in the ALJ’s analysis in
this regard.  The ALJ pointed out that in the first decision Lee had testified that
these limitations affected her non-dominant hand, and were consistent with her
physician’s view that her condition was mild in character.  Upon remand, as the
ALJ noted, there was an absence of any medical documentation that these
limitations were disabling. 
Lee contends that the ALJ erroneously found that her mental impairment
was not severe.  This finding is supported by substantial evidence as it is consistent
with the opinion of the state agency consultative doctor.  The ALJ appropriately
cited this fact in support of her finding, together with the lack of any medical
documentation indicative of a severe mental impairment. 
Lee faults the ALJ for only partially crediting her testimony.  The contrast
between Lee’s testimony and the medical documentation, as the ALJ noted,
6supports the determination that Lee was not fully credible.  
Finally, we reject Lee’s argument that the hypothetical posed by the ALJ to
the vocational expert was inadequate because it failed to include her mental
limitations and her non-exertional limitations.  There was no need to include a
mental impairment in the hypothetical as the determination that her condition was
not severe was supported by substantial evidence.  The ALJ accounted for Lee’s
non-exertional limitations by posing a hypothetical that sought information about
work of a light to sedentary level.
In sum, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
determination that Lee was not disabled for a closed period of time.  Accordingly,
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
